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THE EXIS'I'ENCE OF EFFICIENT AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE 
EQUILIBRIA WITH PUBLIC GOODS* 
by 
Theodore Groves** and John O. Ledyard*** 
Introduction 
In the paper "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods . • •  11 [1977] we 
presented an informationally decentralized mechanism for determining 
public goods allocations which rely on consumers correctly revealing· 
their demands for pul.lic r;oods. The important feature of this mechanifirn 
is the fact that if consumers behave competitively in markets for pri,-ate 
goods and follow Ma�li behavior in their choices of messages ("demands") 
to the mechanism, then, for a wide class of economies, equilibria will 
be Pareto optimal. 
It is now known that other mechanisms for public go
ods allocation
also have the proper1;y that their (Nash) equilibria
 e.re Pareto optimal.
Two such mechanisms are examined in the papers of H
urwicz [1976] and
Walker [1977]. Another is the particularly simple oneY that chooses a
level of public good» equal to the quantity demand
ed by consumers and
assesses each one a ·:onstant, arbitrarily fixed, pr
oportional share of
*· 
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our earlier paper (referenced herein as Groves and
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the total cost. Although equilibria for this mechanism are efficient, 
they rarely exist! In this paper we show that, for a wide class of 
economies, an equilibrium lmder our mechanism exists and, thus, the Pareto 
optimality of equilibria is not a vacuous property. 
The strongest conjecture one might seek to prove is that equilibria 
under our mechanism exist whenever the econolJ\Y has a Lindahl equilibrium.g/ 
However, this conjecture is false for an interesting economic reason. The 
tax rules of our mechanism, which assign cost shares for the· public goods 
provided, maY confiscate enough wealth from a consumer to leave· him worse 
off than he would be consuming only his initial endowment.l/ In extreme
cases, his tax may be greater than his wealth and thus maY bankrupt him. 
But this can occur only when too many resources are devoted to the production 
of public goods. Thus an additional assumption ruling out such cases, along 
with assumptions sufficient.to guarantee Lindahl equilibria .exist, suffice 
to establish existence under our mechanism. The addition assumption is, 
approximately, that at all Pareto-optimal allocations the amount of private 
goods consumption is greater than some small but strictly positive amount. 
Thus, most economies with a Lindahl equilibrium will have an equilibrium under 
our mechanism as well. 
In Section 2, we present the F,eneral model of a competitive private 
ownership economy with a government (or mechanism) and the specific govern-
ment we developed in [1977]. In Section 4, the existence theorem delineating 
the economies having equilibria under the rules defining our government is 
stated and proved. Because the model is general and technically complicated, 
**�Northwestern University and California Institu
te of Technology (F�irchild
we present in Section 3 a related existence theorem for simple two good 
Scholar) 
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(one private-one public ) neoclassical economi es with bounded consumptions . 
A heuristic example explaining how the bankruptcy problem can aris e  under 
standard assumptions is also given. 
2. Competitive Private Ownership Economies with Government 
2.1 The Ec·o�-
We consider an Arrow-Debreu private ownership econoll\Y with public
goods and a government. A bundle of L private goods is denoted by x ,  
an element of JRL ( L-dimensional Euclidean space ) ,  end a bundle o f  K
public goods is denoted by y ,  an element of · K JR • Prices for private
and public goods are denoted by p E JRL and q E JRK 
. L+K a price system for all goods by s = (p ,q ) E IR • 
respectively , end 
There are I > 3 consumers ; each characterized by (i) a consump-
· Xi C JRL+IC ( . .  ) f d . tion set _ , ii a pre erence or ering �i
(iii ) an initial endowment of private goods , wi E IRL.
on f, end 
There are J
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Definition 2.1: 
i j 4/ 
An attainable allocation a is an (I + 1 + J )-tuple 
{<X >,y,<z >}- where i E L . E K x JR , y JR , and zj E JRL+K such that
(i ) 
(2.1) (ii ) 
(iii ) 
(i ,y) E Xi all i ,  
zj E Zj all j , and
i i j [Ei (x - w ) ,y ] = E j 
z 
A private ownership economy i s  denoted by 
2.2 The Government 
- . i j ij . E = {<K ·�· ,w >,<Z > ,<a >}. i . 
In a·private ownership econoIJ\Y, private goods are purchased by 
consumers in markets but public goods are purchased in markets only by a 
special agent--the government . The government must therefore (i ) choose 
the quantity of each public good to purchase and (ii ) raise through taxes 
the necessary funds to finance its purchases . Now, to perform these tasks 
efficiently , the government needs to obtain information about; consumers' 
producers; each characterized by a production s et Zj C IRL+K
preferences .  Thus we suppose the consumers communicate mess�ges t o  the 
con Gaining 1 
government that the government then uses to determine the pu�lic goods 
all technologically feasible input-output vectors _j=(zj�) u x' y· • .Associated
· 
with each producer 
o < eij < 1 and
profits. 
J is a profit share distribution <Sij > . withi 
E. Elij = 1 i where e
ij is consumer i's share of firm•j's
The distinction between private and public goods results from spec-
= z y is . consumedifying that the total net production of public goods, Ej
z; 
by each consumer whereas that of private goods, E
j
z� zx' is to be divided
among the consumers . Thus: 
quantities and taxes in accordance with s ome fixed rule s .  
Formally, a government G, is specified by (i ) a langµage or 
message space M, an abstract set , containing as elements al� possible
messages , mi , each consumer may send, (ii ) an allocation rul�,
I IRL+K .,,,K h" h i t " f j 
. t ! ( l I)y: � x +.m , w ic s a func ion o oin messages m = m , • • .  ,m 
' 
and prices s = (p , q )  specifying the quantities o f  the pub l�c goods to 
be purchase d, and (ii i )  consumer tax rule s , Ci: if x JRL+K + JR, that
specify each consumer's lump-sum tax as a function , als o ,  of1 join� messages 
m and prices s .  We may thus denote an arbitrary governmen� by 
G = {M,y ( • ) ,<Ci(• )>}.
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2.3 Producer and Consumer Behavior 
As price-taking profit maximizers, each producer j is assumed. to 
choose an input-output vector from his production set Zj that maximizes 
s • zj for given prices s. 
Definition 2.2: 
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. ) . ( . 
131(m J. ,s ,w1) - {(:i ,iih E m1x M ! (ii ,y (m/iih) E f, 
-i i -i ) p • x + C (m/m ,s 
where wi is his wealth. 
(ii) 
' 
ii < w } - : 
(i) The E"Upply correspondence of the j-th firm, <j>j: 
The decision correspondence of the i-th constlmer, ! 
:.RL+K + mL+K· oi: MI-1 x mL+K x m + mL x M is defined by: 
is defined by: 
<j>j(s) :: {zj E Zj Is· zj is maximal over Zj} 
(ii). The profit function of the j-th firm, irj: 
mL+K + m is 
defined by: 
irj (s) :: s • <j>j(s) 
Each consumer must choose a private goods consumption bundle xiE m1 
i ru1d a message m E M to send the government. We assume consumers take 
as given the prices of all goods, their wealth, and the messages of all 
other consumers. They do consider, however, how their message affects 
the allocation of public goods and their tax. Thus, each chooses a decision 
pair (xi,mi) to maximize preferences over consumption bundles (xi,y) 
subject to a budget constraint. 
Definition 2. 3: 
(i) The budget correspondence of the i··th consumer, 
ai: MI-1 x mL+K x m +IB1 x M is defined by:'i/ 
I 
..,i< )i( il { (-i -i i Ji( i I <
-i < 1-i>> i < i < 1-i>> u m ,s ,w :: x ,m ) E 13 (m ,s ,w ) x ,y m m :::>,. x ,y m m . 7 
for all i i i )i( i (x ,m ) E 13 (m ,s,w ) 
2.4 Equilibrium 
' 
The concept of an equilibrium for this model is a natu±-a1 generaliza­! i 
tion of a competitive equilib.rium for the private goods only model. 
I 
Definition 2.4: A competitive equilibrium under the government G 
! 
in the private ownership economy E is an (I + J + 1)-tuplei 
'e: = t<xi,mi>,<zj>,s} of consumer decisions, producer decisiohs, and a 
I price system such that: i 
(i) 
. . . ) . ( i (x1,m1) E o1(m 1 ,s,w (s)) all i 
[ 
(preferenc� 
where the wealth of i is: 
i 
wi ( s) = p • (l)i + l: eij 1fj ( s). 
j i 
maximization), andi 
[ 
(ii) 
maximization) 
(iii) 
zj E <l>j (s) all j 
i . (l:. (x - w1),y (m)) = 
(profit 
l: zj 
j 
(supply equals a.em.iina). J. 
I 
I 
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2.5 The ()1111.draLic• c:nvcr·rrn'.<'111. nnd l'ot.0nl.i11..1 l.l:mkrupl;e;y Each consumer's message 
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mi mey be interpreted as his demand I {which mey be I I 
In our previous paper [1977] this model was developed to examine the negative) since the allocation is .just the sum of all consumer�' messages I 
so-called "Free Rider Problem." We defined a specific government such that {demands). Each consumer's tax consists of a proportional sha�e of the 
if faced with its particular allocation and tax rules, each consumer would total cost plus an amount increasing in the squared deviation �f his 
find it in his self -interest to correctly reveal his true demand for the 
ptiblic goods, even thougt he could falsely report his demand without fear 
of detection. Both Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economies were proved: 
A competitive equilibrium under this government is Pareto-optimal (Non-
wastefullness Theorem) and every Pareto-optimal allocation is a competitive 
allocation following, if necessary, some redistribution of initial endow-
ments (Unbiasedness Theorem). 
The particular (class of) government we analyzed, called the 
Quadratic (Q) r,overnment,.§.1 is specified by: 
(2.2) 
where 
(2.3) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
l:.a i l. 
GQ = [M;y(•),<Ci(·)>} where 
M = JRK 
h y(m) = l: m h 
i( ) i h y[I - 1  i i >2 i
2
] C m,s = a q • l: m + 2 --(m - µ - rJ h I 
= 1 , y > 0 are parameters and 
{µi -
. 2  l. rJ 
)'( 1 h ( l. ) = -- i: ..i;.m µ m - I _ 1 hri 
. 2 )'( 2 1 ( h l.) ( l. ) = -- i: -" ' m - µ rJ m - I - 2 hrl.
demand from the average of the others' demands and decreasing �n the sum 
I 
.of squared deviations of the others' demands from their averagF·· Another 
interpretation of a consumer's message as reported willingness! to pey is · 
provided in Groves and Ledyard [1977]. 
i 
RemarK: It should be noted that both Fundamental Theo�ems of 
Welfare Economics remain valid for some· variants in the choicJ of the I 
parameters ai and y in the cost rules Ci(.) of GQ. Fi�st of all, 
s. As dpecified 
in (2.2), the cost functions Ci(.) are not homogeneous of dJgree one 
in prices and thus, the cc.1Sumers' decision rules ("demand fudctions") I 
i a and y can be permitted to depend on the prices 
are not homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income. HowJver, if 
y*(s) = y • ll sll is substituted for y in (2.2), homogeneity [will be 
assured without affecting the validity of the optimality theoJems in 
·[1977] or the existence results presented below. Similarly, Jarameter 
ai may be made dependent on prices s and also on the otherlagents' 
messages, m)i(, and other potentially observable data of the model such 
l:. ai = 11 which l. The only constraint is the equality as endowments. 
must be satisfied, at least in equiliorium. 
we consider the variant in which ai 
In proving existence below 
I 
i• the proportioo of a� i'e 
wealth to aggregate wealth. 
i 
3. 
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Existence and Optimality for Two Good Neo-Classical Economies with 
Bounded Consumptionl/ 
3. 1 The Simple Economy 
In this model, we assume there are only two goods, one public, y, 
and one private, x, (L = K = 1). We cons.ider a single producer (J  = 1) 
with. the linear tecl:mology, zy 
generality, let c = 1. Thus 
-czx for zx s O. Without loss in 
Z = {z EIB21z = -z , z < O} an1 the onJ.�r y x x -
relative price q/p consistent with profit maximization for this technology_ 
is unity ( 1) at which no profits are realized. We therefore set the price 
ratio q/p to unity and do not need to specify.a profit share distribution. 
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Proposition 1: An allocation a = ( <xi> ,y) E lR�+l is I Pareto-optimal 
( i. e. efficient)
.
if but not 
.. 
only if 
I E.xi + y = E.wi, and I ( i) ( 3. 2) l. • . 
l. 
. • • 1. 
( ii) E . �i( xi,y) = 1 where �i(·,·) = (aui/ay)/(aui/ axi) 
is i's margina: rate of substitution of the private for the phblic good. 
Note that while (i) is also necessary for efficiency since itl is required 
for any attainable allocation, ( ii) is not since there may exist boundary 
(i. e. where i = O) Pare·t;o optima not satisfying ( ii). . I 
The I > 3 consumers in this model are characterized by ( i) their consumption 3. 2 The Quadratic Go���nt I sets f 2 lR+' ( ii) their initial endowment of the private good wi > O, 
and (iii) their preferences �. l. which are assumed to be representable on 
Xi by a strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, smooth ( i. e. continuous 
second derivatives) utility function ui ( .  ,• ) defined over the entire 
space lR2. ( In other words, we assume there exists a function ui(. '• ) 
defined on JR2 with these properties such that on 
represents i's preferences.) 
,, . . 
xi = IB2 + the function 
Let E = {<1R'-,ui (-) ,wi>} + denote this economy. An attainable 
allocation 
(i) 
( 3.1) ( ii) 
a for E is an ( I  + 1)-tuple ( <xi>,y) E 1Rn+l 
xi � O, y � 0, i. e. i 
. 
( x  ,y) E Xi all 
y = Ei(w
i xi), i. e. zy = -zx where 
i i z = E . ( x  - w ). x l. 
i. 
zy y 
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show: 
such that 
and 
Under the Quadratic government GQ, defined by (2.2) !above, a 
competitive equilibrium for the economv E is given simply by a joint 
message � such that: I I 
Ai . i. i A i ·h i I m maximizes u LX (!11/ m  ) ,Eh#m + m ] 
I 
i A i •h i I ( 3. 3) subject to ( x ( m/m ),Eh#im + m )�O 1 
i· i i i· i I and x ( m/m ) = w - C (m/ m  ) • 11 
Ai Ai A A ( It is easy to see that the ( I + 2)-tuple ( <x ,m >,z,s) where 
·i i A A Ai i A A I x : x ( m), z :  ( i: . ( x  - w ),yEm)), and s = 1 satisfies Definition 2.4 l. - I under our general assumptions on E. )�/ 
I It may be observed that if the non-negativity constraints are not 
binding in ( 3. 3), then the competitive equilibrium joint messlge is just 
a Nash equilibrium of the n-person game defined by the governlent · 
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Gq {M,y(. ),<Ci( .)>} and economy E 2 i• i {<IR+,u (.),w >} 
in normal form: 
( 3. 4) Q 
• • 
F, = {I ,<If», <vi(·)>} 
as follows, 
where I: {l, ... ,I} is the player set, 1i = M is player i's strategy 
space, and vi( .)  = ·u.(i( .),y(. )) is i's payoff function where l. 
i( 
. i i x · ) = w - c ( . ). Note that by assuming ui( .)  is defined over all 
of IR2, the payoff function i (.)  are well-defined over the space r.f 
of all joint strategies m. 
Thus, every interior competitive equilibrium (i. e. one at which the 
non-negativi.ty constraints are not tight) is ,defined by a Nash equilibrium 
� a.t which y(�) and i(�), for all i, are non-nep.;ative (i. e. the allocation 
is individually feasible). Furthermore, if the economy E is such that 
all Nash equilibria of FQ yield individually feasible allocations, then 
every competitive equilibrium is interior and is defined by a Nash equi-
librium. However, for general economies E, .not every Nash equilib1·ium 
will yield a competitive equilibrium and not every competitive equilil,lrium 
is defined by a Nash equilibrium. 
3.3 Optimality of an Interior Equilibrium 
In order to prove that every interior competitive equilibrium under 
GQ is efficient we use the following characterization of the Nash equi­
libria of FQ 
Proposition 2: A joint message m is a Nash Equilibrium (N .E .) · 
of the game FQ if and 
.
only if 
( 3. 5) • :i. • • 111. [x (m) ,y{m)] 
-12-
i y(I - l)(·i ·i) a + I m - µ  all i 
Proof: m is a N.E. if and only if for every i, �i maximizes 
i - i i i. ·i • i I i v (m/m ) = u [x (m/m ) ,y(m/m ) ]. Under our general assumptions on u , 
the First Order Conditions are both necessary and sufficient flr �i to 
maximize i (�/mi) . Thus 
( 3. 6 )  
or 
ai l = au� . ax� +�ui · � = au\_ai_ y(I - l)(mi_µi) � + aui = 0 
a i a:i. a:i. ay a i  a i r i ay m • x m m x m 
i au /ay -.--i au1/ax 'm 
; [xi(�) ,y(�)] ai + y(I - l)(1i - ih I 
The First Welfare Theorem (Non-wastefulness) may now bej proved for 
those economies E, under �he Quadratic government, for which �11 competi• 
tive equilibria are interior. 
Theorem 1: Every interior competitive equilibrium undelr GQ for. 
the economy E is Pareto-optimal. 
R!:2.2!: Since every interior competitive equilibrium is defined by 
a N.E. of FQ at which the allocation is individually feasib�e, it suf­
fices to show that the allocation defined by any N.E. i is jfficient if 
it is a.lso individually feasible. By Proposition 1 we thus Jly need show 
:i. i· A i· . i I E.11 [x (m),y(m)] = 1, since E.x (m) + y(m) = Eiw by the def.inition of l. l. 
xi(m) as 
-13-
E.Ci(rn) = y(m) for every joint message m under GQ. But, i 
by Proposition 2, since m satisfies (3.5), 
. i . . E.1?[x {m ),y(m)] i 
i y(I -1) ("i •i) Ea. + I Ei m - µ 
3 .4 Existence of an Eguilibritun 
1 
In order to p:rove the existence of a competitive equilibrium we first 
prove that the game FQ has a Nash equilibrium. In addition to the general 
assumptions on the ut;ili ty functions already introduced, we make two 
additional primarily technical assumptions: 
Asstpnption A . l: For every 
. i i , lirn i? ( xt ,y t) yt.-
0 i - · if xt :;. XL < co 
rill 
Ass 
such that 
Ass 
xi is arbitrary. 
tion A.2: 
i Eix .:'. 
i LW i 
. i E.11i(x ,0) > 1 i for all 
1 I I x = (x , . . •  ,x ) E JR 
iption A. l lll'�rely requires that if i's consumption of private 
good is bounded above, then i becomes satiated in the limit with the 
public good . Since the set of attainable allocations for the economy E 
is compact, this assumption does not restrict preferences at all in 
c;ons urner i's attainc.ble consumption set. Assumption A. 2 ensures that 
some {positive ) amount of the public good will be produced at any Nash 
-14-
Proof: We outline a proof .of this theorem through a serii.es of lemmas. 
i I-1 i Lenuna 1: If 1jJ : � + M is defined by: m 
solution of equation ( 3. 5) for every m)i ( E J-l and 
J + ri, then 1jJ is a well-defined continuous function 
of iJ! is .a Nash equilibrium of the game FQ. 
Proof: Straightforward. 
ljii(m)i(I) is the 1jJ = (r, . . .  ,ljJI): and a fixed point 
Now, to use the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem to prove 1jJ I has a fixed 
po'in� we need to ·find a compact convex set M C J such that I w maps M 
into M. There does not appear to be an obvious natural set'l/ I and thus we 
resort to the standard trick of general equilibriums analysis 6f bounding 
M artificially and then relaxing the bound. Thus for every ilteger · 
I 
T > O, let Mir be the {closed) interval [-T,IT], Mir : [-T,IT�, and let 
1jJ �{ • ) be i's reaction function when restricted to choose mess�es from 
Mir: i.e. 
1v�(m)i() 
Lenuna 2: ljii(.) T 
mi solves Max · vi(m/mi) 
mieMrr 
is a continuous function from {Mrr)I-
ll into 
�: Straightforward. 
Mir· 
Thus, ljJT = (lji� , • • .  ,i:i;) is a continuous function from /(l.i.:r)I into 
{Mir) I and as (Mir) I is compact and convex, ljJT ( • ) has a fixld point . m.T 
Theorem 2: Under the genernl assumptions on the utility function J by the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. 
equilibrium. It is not a necessary assumption but technically avoids 
considerations of boundary cases. 
and Assumptions A. l and A. 2, the game FQ has a Nash Equilibrium ;, 
-15-
l 
Lemma 3: Tr f'or nomc vnl uc of 'l' > 0, -'I' < m,l' < l
'l' for every i 
(where mT is a fix1:d point of ijJT
( • )) , then 
� 
:: m 
for the game FQ. 
is a Nash Equilibrium 
f!:22_[: Immediate, since if the constraints on the messages m� 
are not binding, then m; = !)i(m;); i.e. m� is a fixed point of ip( •) 
(as well as ijJ
T
(•)) and thus, by Lemma 1, is a N.E. 
that 
Thus, we need to find some T* sufficiently large to guarantee 
-T* < mi < IT* for all :i:. T* 
Lemma 4: Under Assumption A. 2, for every T ;: 1, y( mT) > 0 at the 
fixed point mT 
of ipT( • ) . 
Proof: Suppose not; y(mT) � O for some T � 1. By Assumption A.2, 
quasi-concavity of u
i(·), and since E.xi(m ) = E.wi - E.Ci(mT) r T i i 
Eiw
i - y(
�
) � Ewi, 
. . 
i 
Ei11l.(xl.(m'l,) ,y(mT)) > 1 = E. 
ac (
�
) 
1 ami 
Thus, for some i0, 
. i 
10 i ac 
O( ) 
11 (x O(m ),y(m )) > --� T T i 
am 0 
which implies the upper constraint is binding for i0 
h 
But, then, y(m.r) = IT+Eh#io
m.r � IT- (I- l)T = T > O. 
io 
and thus m = IT. 
Contradiction. · 
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Lemma 5:  Under Assumption A. l, for every T .'.: l/Y, 
f.!£21.: i Suppose not; mT = -T some i and T. 
i aci 11 I <-= mT - Clmi 
i a + 
. 1 y{n? - :fY(m.r)) 
i �a - yT 
as y(mT) > 0 by Lemma 4. Thus 11 m _::: a - yT < 0 
i
i 
i 
T . 
contradicting the strict monotonicity of u 1  (•, •). 
Lemma 6: . Under Assumptions A. l and A. 2, there 
such that m�* < IT* for every i. 
Then 
Proof: Suppose not; then there is some i and a 
. i i as t + 00 such that mt :: m.rt 
= ITt all t. But then 
i
i 
i ( :i, 1 ( )) 'IT mt ::: 
a + y mt - :f Y mt 
. 1 a1 + y(IK - -y(m ) ) t I t 
2 
as I Tt :;:. y{mt) :;:. Tt all t. 
Thus, as t fa>, Tt f+oo and y(mt) ++00 and ilmt 
t which would contradict Assumption A.l if xi(mt) � x
i 
t. Since 
i( )  i i ( )  v[I- l( i x m  =w -ay m --'- -- m t t 2 I t 
i 2 y i2 
µt) ] + 2°t 
it suffices to shOIT that 
.2 
cri t 
Now at the fixed point 
is bounded above. 
mt' since 11
h;: 0 and m� > 
Lelllllla 5 , for every h, either 
-T for all i. 
i a 
T* .? l/y 
T + "" t 
i » 0 all 
-i some x all 
by 
-17-
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h
i 
h h 1 
'lT mt:_ 
a +y[mt-Iy(mt)] 
h mt = ITt , in which ca.Se The crux of the difficulty lies in the fact that the ta.X rules 
Ci(•) 
or 'lT =a +y(m --y(m )] > 0 h i 
h h 1 
mt t I t 
in which case h 1 ) 1 h lTt .'.: mt .'.: yy(mt -:ya total 
of the government are potentially confiscatory of a conJumer's 
endowment. For example, suppose all consumers but one aje identical 
Thus in either case ITt.:: m�.:: f Y(mt) -� ah.:: fY(mt) -� :for all h, and 
thus ITt:_µ�:_fy(mt)-�. 
Hence 
1 1 I h hi (IT - -y(m ) .;. -) > m -µ > 0 t I t y - t ·t all h which implies 
oi2 - _1_ E h h 2 < .1.::.1. 1. +1 2 t - I-2 hCn\- mt) - I-2(ITt- I y(mt) y) 
But y(mt) 
i h I-1 ) 1 h) mt + Eh;'imt .:: ITt + -I-y(mt -y(Eh'fi a which implies · 
and 
0 � ITt -fy(mt) < 
1 h 1 
Y Eh#i a ::=-:y and 
/ O' • t 
I - l <--· -I - :? 
4 8 --- < -2 - 2 y y 
as n.:: 3 
1 1 2 4 (IT --y(m ) +-) < -t I .t y - 2 y 
Lemma 6 thus completes the proof of Theorem 2. Q.E.D. 
Although we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium for 
the game FQ, in order to conclude th� existence of a competitive equi­
librium under GQ. we need to ensure that the allocation (<x
i(m)>,y(m)) 
defined by the Nash equilibrium is individually feasible for every i. 
The assumptions introduced thus far are not sufficient unless privat'� good 
consumption is unbounded from below ( :l. e. xi = JR x JR+>. 
and have such strong preferences for the public good that theylare willing 
to spend any positive wealth on the public good while the remaining con­
sumer, 1, is indifferent to the public good and thus always atJempts to 
minimize his tax. However, since he is atypical, in additio� Jo paying his 
fixed share a1 of whateve� quantity is purchased, he must alJo pay for. 
the deviation of his message from the others' mean: [y(I-l)/JI](m1 -µ1)2. 
Each· one of the similar consumers thus will have his tax reducJd from 
his fixed share a i so that in aggregate the similar consumerJ pay their 
· 2 I fixed shares E i#l�i less the amount [y(I -1) /2I ](m1 -µ1) received from 
the atypical consumer. Now suppose each consumer's fixed sharJ ah is 
set equal to his relative w�alth wh/Eiw
i. (If not,it is easy/to construct 
examples to bankrupt any consumer with a greater fixed share.) Then, at 
any Nash equilibrium, m, the similar consumers are spending ali their 
wealth on the public good and the atypical consumer 1 is minJmizing his 
cost. Thus 
E i" 
A 
i#lc (m) =
" i+ Y(I-l)(Al_A1)
2
=" i. (A)_Y(I�l),Al_A1)
2 
,, i#lw 2 I m µ ,, i#{' Y m " .. m µ 
which fmplies that 
y(i7t) = E.wi + J. E . .i. i J.rl 
Al 2 µ ) i > Eiw since in
1 1 µ1 
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as 1 is not similar to the other consumers. 
i A i i A and x (m) = w - C (m) = O for all i # 1, 
But as i A A • ' E.C (m) =y(m) >I:.wJ. J. J. 
1 A x (m) �.xi(�) J. I:.w
i - E.Ci(�) = E.wi - y(�) < 0 J. J. J. 
Since is cost minimizing at Al m ' 1 /A x (m) < 0, consumer 1 is 1 yet 
-::o-
if the smoothness of ui were not assumed. If "lfi(xi,y) is discon-
tinuous at xi = 0 then it is suffficient to assume Assumption IA. 3 holds 
at all xi < O, an assumption that places no restriction on preferences 
in the feasible set. 
bankrupt at any Nash equilibrium. 
Assumption A. 4 is the substantive assumption needed to ensure that 
nearly al� the private good endowment will not be used to prodlce the 
More generally, this type of bankruptcy arises if (i) there exist public good, regardless of which attainable private good dis�rdbution is 
suf'ficient diversity in the preferences for public goods, and simultaneously,. realized. 
,
The number l/Y 
. 
is the 
.
minimum amount of private· glod avail-
(ii) aggregate demand at the fixed cost share prices i equal to relative able at any efficient allocation.
11 1 
wealth is close to the maximum feasible output of the public good fo� the 
economy. When these two conditions exist, there may not be. enough private 
good left over after producing the demanded high quantity of public good 
to serve as the medium of transfers to compensate for the 'diversity of tastes. 
To avoid the bankruptcy problem, and thus prove a competitive equi--
librium exists, we rule out preferences leading to near total public good 
production. Speci fic:ally, consider the two assumptions. 
Assumption A.:!: For any i, i(o,y) < wi/EhJ"l for all y > 0. 
Assumption A.li:lO/ 
y h Ehw 
h Ehx 
E.7ri(xi,y) < 1 for all J. 
and " h < 1 "hx - Y 
«i>. ,y) J. such that· 
Assumption A. 3 is a technical assumption made to ensure no consumer 
would ever choose to spend his entire income on the public good.if charged 
i i; h . a = w Ehw per unit at the margin. Such boundary cases could be.allowed 
i u 
Theorem 3: Under the general assumptions on the utility functions 
and Assumptions A. 1-A. 4, if ai = wi/�.)l then at any NashJequilibrium 
Di of FQ, the allocation (<xi(m)>,y(m)) is individually feiible. 
establish that �: By Lemma 4, y(m) > o. Thus , we need only 
i A x (m) � 0 for all i. 
A A h 1 �: y = y(m) .S 1ivr· - -y· 
A i Ai A h Ah Proof: At m, Ei"lf (x ,y) = 1 and y = �w-- - �:x:--. Thus, by 
Assumption 4 and the quasi-concavity of ui, 
Now 
A h 1 Y .S �w - Y 
i A i iA y I- 1  Ai Ai 2 YAi2 i iA y,I � l) Ai Ai)2 x (m) = w -a y --(--)(m -ii ) +-a > w -a y -� -- (m -ii 2 I 2 - 2 ] 
Since at the N.E. " ("i m, m 
-?l-
ih I Ai y(I - 1) (11 a
i) where Ai 7T 11i lin 
xi(�) i > w - aiy _ .J:..(_I_ Ai i 2 2Y I - 1)(71 - a )  and as a
i = wi /'f.hw
h 
y < r. wh 1 - h - y and 1 > 
1(-I-) i - 2 I - l a 
i " ai 1 I "i i 2 1 . I "i i Ai x (m) > - - -(--)(11 - a ) > -(--)11 (2 a - 7T ) - y 2Y I - l  - 2Y I - l . 
-2:?-
if the parameters ai were not dependent on the particular data of the 
economy, except perhaps, its size: (e.g., if ai = l/I). Itlcan be 
shown that Theorem 3 remains valid without the requirement that 
ai = wi/'f.hw
h if Assumption A.3 is replaced by: 
Assumption A. 3': For any i, 11i(O,y) < ai for all yl> O, 
and Assumption 4 is replaced by: 
Assumption A.4': r..11i(xi ,y) < 1 for all l. 
i A Ai i i If x (m) � O, then 11 < a by quasi-concavity of u and Assumption A� 3 Y. i i r.iw - 'f.ix . and r..x
i < I/(2 y(I - 1)) +Max l. - . 
(<xi>. ,y). such that 
h 1 • I i {'f.hw - (w1/a )}. 
which implies that xi(�) > O which is a contradiction. Thus, xi\,;_) ::. 0 
as was to be shown. 
Corolla:s'l.: Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, there exists a 
competitive equilibrium under GQ. 
' 
Furthermore, under these assumptions. 
every competitive .equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
f.!:2.Q.f.: Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 imply there exists a N.F.. m at 
which the allocation ( <x1(�)> ,y(�)) is individually feasible. Thus 
m def.ines a competitive equilibrium under GQ Furthermore, Theorem 3 
implies every N.E. m yields individually feasible allocations. Hence, 
the set of N.E. and competitive equilibrium coincide and every .competitive 
l. 
4. Existence of a General Competitive Equilibrium under the Quadratic Government 
4.1 The Assumptions 
For the general econonzy- defined in Section 2 E = {<>f l  <:::.i_, ,} >, 
<Zj >, <Sij >} we assume the following standard conditions of �eneral equi-
librium analysis: 121 
' 
Standard Assumptions: E satisfies, for every i and I j 
i . K . -1 . (a) X = x1 xJR+; x1 .S JR , x1 is closed, convex, andlhas a 
lower bound for �. 
equilibrium is interior. 
(b.l) for every (xi ,y) E Xi, there exists an xi' such that 
By Theorem 1, then , every competitive equilibrium i, . . 1 • I ( x ,y) E X1 and ( x1 ,y) >· ( x1 ,y). (non-satiation in private goods) l. is Pareto Optimal. 
Although the assumption of Theorem 3 that the proportional cost 
shares, ai, equal proportional wealth, wi/r.hw
h, does not seem to be an 
unimplementable requirement, it is interesting to know what would happen 
( ) (-i - , 1 c 1 > i I i , c-1 
-> b. 2 for·every x ,y EX , the sets { x ,y EX 1x ,y �i. x ,y } 
and {(xi,y) E Xi l(xi,y)_:Si (xi,y)} are closed. (continuity of preferences) 
(b.3) for every (xi,y) and (Xi,y) EXi, if (xi,y) >. (ii,y) l. 
and O < >. < 1 then >.(xi,y) + (1- 1.)(ii,y) >j_ (ii.,y). (co:t).vexity of 
preferences) 
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(c) wi E int "J!. (feasibility of the initial endOWJDent) 
( d.l) 
(d.2) 
OE Zj. (possibility of inaction) 
Z is closed and convex where z = I: zj 
j 
is the aggregate 
production set of E. 
( d. 3) 
( d.4) 
zn(-Z)C{O}. 
z :::> (-n) where 
(irreversibility of production) 
S'l :: IRL+K 
+ . (free disposal) 
As for the simple nee-classical model of Section 3, the standard 
assumptions alone are nut sufficient to prove the existence of a competitive 
equilibrium under the government GQ, because of the possibility some 
consumers may be driven into bankruptcy when all agents maximize preferences 
or profits. Bankruptcy may result under the tax rules of GQ . either if 
all private goods prices are driven to zero or if the demand for public 
-24-
i Note that A depends only on the consumption sets X i K X x  :m+. l the 
production sets Zj • and the aggregate endowment of private goods!, t1w1 ·= !II• 
Let 
(4. 2) 
c > .Q 
Ay denote the set of attainable public goods bundles: 
A :: {y E :m! I there exists 
Y. 
a' EA with y' = y} 
Our first additional assumption is: 
Assumption (d.5): 
and some z · E JR
L 
x • 
Given BilY y E A , ( z , y + c 1) E Z · fior some y x -
where 1. :: (1, • . .  ,1) E �. 
To define our other assumption, let H denote those publ�c goods 
bundles in Ay that are bounded away from the upper boundary by lthe amount 
l/y where y is the parameter on the quadratic terms of the tax rules 
goods is too great.l3/ To rule out these possibilities we make two additional 
for the Quadratic government GQ: 
assumptions. First, we assume technology would permit the production of 
more of every public good than is possible at any attainable state if 
resources were large er..ough. Second, we assume that at a feasible alloca-
tion, if every consumer is too close to the boundary of the private goods 
portion of his consumpi;ion set or, put BI!other way, if public goods output 
(4. 3) H :: {y E � jy + � 1 E Ay-} 
Our second additional assumption is: 
Assumption (e): If a= (<xi>,y , <zj >) EA and y '/:. H, then 
· · · rivate i' j' could not be increased some incremental amount without requiring more P there exists some a•= (<x >,y' ,<z >)EA with y' EH such/that 
good inputs than would be available, then all consumers would prefer some 
(xi' ,y') >-. (xi, y) for all i. i 
feasible allocation at which the amount of public goods were smaller. 
economy 
(4.1) 
Formally,. let A 
E: 
denote the set of attainable states for the Note that Assumption (e) can be satisfied only if H is not empty. 
Thus, minimally the amount l/y > O . of every public good must bf compatible 
with attainability. Of cour:e, the larger is Y, the less restrictive is 
i j ) I ( i ) . .i j E j ( ( i i) ) - 2: �j } I A = {a = ( <x >, Y , <z > x ,y E X ' z Z ' I:i x - .w ,y · - j . the requirement. However .since Ay = {O} for a private-goods opiy economy:, 
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such economies are not covered by the existence theorem below. But if it 
is assumed that public f,Oods are never undesireable at zero levels, then 
the zero point, y = O, may be adjoined to H and the theorem will cover 
the private-goods only econoll\Y also. 
A weaker but more complicated assumption may be substituted for-
Assumption (e). Let 
P = {a E Al � a' EA such that (xi 1 ,y') >-i (xi ,y) for all 
P is the set of (weak) Pareto-optimal allocations. Under Assumptions 
(a)-(d.5), if a E P, then there exists a support (price) vector s in 
"+k S = {s E JRi I ii s II = i: .e.P g, + Ek qk = 1} such that s • z � s • z' for all 
i} • 
· z' E P(z) :: {z E :ffiL+Klz = Ejz
j for some a EA}. Let S,(a) be the set 
of all such support prices. These prices are not necessarily equilibrium 
prices as they depend only on the technology and the Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion a. The weaker assumption is. 
Assumption (e'): If a E P, then for all s E S(a), 
q • y < E (wh(s) - Min p • xh] - .l h 
}1E:}1 
y 
For the example of Section 3, both Assumptions (e) and (e') are 
equivalent to Assumption A.4. It can also be shown that Assumption (e) 
implies Assumption (e'). 
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4. 2 The Existencr! Theorem: Stntement 
The theorem we prove in: 
Theorem 4.1: The economy with public goods E has a com.Petitive 
equilibrium under the quadratic government GQ under Assumption� (a ) ,  . .. .. . I (b. l)-(b. 3)·, ( c), ( d. 1)-( d. 5), and ( e) when the pare.meters cl of the tax 
rules for GQ are specified by: 
(4.�) 
,,.i ( s) 
ci{s) � 1: (wh(s) h 
Min P • xi 
x�x1 
Min p • xh] 
xhe:-l1 
. . ij j (where wl.(s) = p • ol + Ej6 ;r (s) is consumer i's wealth at prices 
see Definition 2. 4). 
s; 
Remark: As in Section 3, restriction (4. 4) on the parameters ai � 
I may be removed if Assumption (e) or (e') is suitably strengthened. For 
example� consider: 
Assumption (e"): If a E P then, for all 
. 1 . al.q • [y + -1) < w1(s) -y- . 
. i Min p•x 
id 
s E S(a) andlall i, 
Theorem 4. 1 in valid if (e) is replaced by (e") and restrictions I (4. 4) are 
eliminated. (Also, in Assumption (e') and (e"), the scalar (l/y can be 
replaced by the smaller scalll?' [I/2Y(I - 1)].) 
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To see how Assumption (e") relates to. AssUlllption (a.41) of Section 3, 
suppose, in the model cf Section 3, that a E P. Then, by (A.4'), 
E xi > I 
i 
i 2Y(I - 1) + Max {Ehw
h - w.i} a 
or, using the fact that y Ehw
h Eix
i in that model, 
i( I ) i . (l y + n •• ( T 1 \ < W for every ]. 
Furthermore, since p q 1 and· Min P .  xi 0 
iEJ2-
as J2- = l\, assuinp-
ti on (e") is also satisfied (after replacing l/y with I/2y(I - 1)). 
Although the importance of prices in AssUlllptions (e') and (e") may 
seem strange, it should be noted that the tax rules Ci(•) specify pay-
ment only in the unit of account and the purpose of Assumption (e') or (e") 
is to ensure that there is a sufficient amount of the unit of account to . 
carry out the required transfers. AssUlllption (e) is stronger (than (e')) 
since it requires sufficient amount of every private commodity to be avail-
able to carry out the transfers if the tax rules required payment in any 
particular commodity. 
4. 3 Proof of Existence Theorem 
We present a numbered outline of the proof of Theorem 4.1 which follows 
in many details Debreu's existence proof for a private-goods-only econontr. 
Thus, where possible, we refer to the relevant paragraphs of Debreu' s 
proof in [1959]. 
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(1) The set of attainable states A defined in (4 .• lf ils non-empty, 
convex, and compact. 
�: Same as in Debreu [1959] .  
(2) Compactify the message space M as in Section 3 fqr the simple 
econontr: For every· t > 1, let 
i . Mt E {m E Mj-t .:; � .:; It, all k} 
Clearly Mt is non-empty, convex, and compact for all t. 
( 3) E: -i and zj denole the Compactify the econontr Let x 
proj ections of the attainable set A onto x
i and zj respe,cti vely. 
By (1), t and zj are compact and convex. 
For acy number n E .JR, let BN(n) denote the N-dimens1ional cube 
centered at the origin with edges of length 2n; i.e. 
BN(n) E {g E JRN 'jgi I � n all i 1, • • . ,N} 
Given any t > 1 let n(t) E JR be sufficiently large so that 
(i) -1, zj are contained in Blr!-K(n(t)), all i, j I 
(ii) Yt E y(�) E {y E JRKjy = y(m) = �m
h, m E 1>�} C B
I
K(n(t)) · and 
(iii) B1(n(t)) contains the lower bound of J2-, all i (see (a)). 
Define x! E J2- nB1(n(t)), x! : Xi f'lBI.r!-K(n(t)), Z�: Zj f'lB,K(n(t)). 
Clearly these spaces are non-empty, convex, and compact for all t. 
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(4) Define compactified supply correspondences ¢� ( .) 
llj ( • ) 
and profit 
functions 
to zj t• 
11t ( ·) as the restrictions of .pj ( •) and 
As in Debreu ([1959], p. 86, 4 & 5), 11�(·) 
respectively, 
is continuous and 
.pt(.) is non-empty and convex valued and upper semi-continuous (: u. s .·c. , 
L+K hereafter) for every s E JR • 
(A) Discussion: It is not possible at thi� point in our proof to follow 
Debreu and compactify the consumer' ; decision correspondence oi(.) and 
proceed to the compactified excess demand correspondence. As we have noted 
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(5) 
. )i( i Therefore, let i1(m ,s; w ) denote consumer i' 
decision correspondence and be defined by: 
where 
i ) . ( . 
ii(m)i(,s; vi) :  8i(m)i(,s; vi) 
r (m ' ·" •'I 
di(m)i( ,s) - Min 
xid 
i ) "( i i; (m 1 ,s; w ) 
p •.Xi + Min 
miEM 
s.t. y(m)�O 
if 
if 
if 
di(m)i( ,s) 
icm)i( ,s) 
di( )i{ ) m ,s > 
Ci(m/mi, s) is 
above., under the tax rules of Q. G , a consumer's budget set ai(m)i(,s; �i(s)) cost to get into his consumption ·set, and i;i(.) is defined 
(see Definitions 2.3.and 2.4) �be empty for some m)i( and s; i.e. 
consumer i may be bankrupt. Although Assumptions (d.5) and (e) are 
sufficient to prove no consumer is bankrupt at a "fixed point" which we 
show defines an equilibrium, to prove the "fixed point" exists, we need· 
a non-empty, convex valued, and u.s.c. decision correspondence for each 
consumer. 
Thus, we define a pseudo-decision correspondence which agrees with 
the decision correspondence oi(·) (see Definition 2.3) if the consumer 
is not bankrupt, but allows him to choose cost-minimizing consumption a.�d 
message pairs (xi,mi) if he is bankrupt. However, for technical reasons, 
whenever strict cost-minimization would eliminate the bankruptcy (this can 
happen only if h i l:h#1\: + � = yk(m) < 0 for some 
i k where .!!!. minimizes 
Ci(m,s) over M) we allow him to cost minimize only to the brink to 
solvency. 
i( )i( i) f ( -i -i) . ..i -i i; m ,s; w : l x ,m E :X-x Mix minimizes i P•X 
and either 
(a) mi= .fili(m)i(,s) = J!!i minimizes c1(m,s) 
i {-{I -
1\: � i 
� 
iJ,�} 
as µ� t}o 
if Ci(m/l ,s) i Mi i > w - n p • x , or 
xie(-
every k 
over M 
(b) iiii maximizes q •Min· {O,y(m)} subject to 
1-(I - l)µil 
{
i) m!: � µ! 
k 
. 
as µ! {:}o every k 
r-, 
to 
if 
and (ii) 
i i ) C (m/,!!! ; s 
Ci(rn,s) 
i < w -
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< ;/ - Min 
xid 
Vd .n 
iE� 
P .  xi} · 
P • xi 
(B) Discussion: In the definition above the pseudo-decision 
( = p.-decision, herea�er) correspondence, the consumer's wealth wi is 
an exogenous variable. Typically, for private'� <?W!lership general equilibrium 
models, income is endogenously determined as.tqe·value of the initial endow­
ment, plus the share:.; of firms' Ilrofits: wi(s:)::!p"<i + Eje
ij'!Tj(s). 
However, in our model, since the p.-decision correspondence aJ..lows 
a consumer's decisfon (xi,mi) to violate the bµdget constraint under some 
circumstances, if wi is set equal to wi(s) a situation ·may arise in 
which the value of aggregate excess demand is strictly positive, i.e. 
Walras' Law iney be violated. Since our proof requires us to show Walras' 
Law holds, we must modify the income determination process. Loosely 
speaking, in the pr�sence of any bankruptcy, we invoke a redistribution 
mechanism. All non-bankrupt consumers are charged in proportion to their 
solvency level to cover the deficits of the bankrupt consumers. 
( 6 )  Define consumer i's degree of solvency (if positive) or� 
ruptcy (if negative) by: 
ri(m,s) : 
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lo if b'(m)i(,,) < o ; i.e. if i '' 
{ bi(m)i(,s) I h )h( I Min h )h( x l b (m ,s) , l b (m ,s) h 
h bh<O 
bh>O 
if bi(m)i( ,s) > O 
bank]upt 
bi(m>ii<,s)} 
Note that when all consumers are solvent; i.e. i · I i b � O, then r = O, 
i.e. bankruptcy taxes are zero. Note also that i's bankruptcy tax will 
never bankrupt him; i.e. bi(m)i(,s) > O implies after tax s+lvency 
bi(�)i(,s) - ri(m,s) = (wi(s) - ri(m,s)) - di(m)i(,s) � O. 
Now, the consmner's p. -decision correspondence (with erldogenous 
income (wealth) determination) is defined simply by: 
5i(m, s) - gi(m)i( ,s; wi(s) ri(m,s)) 
(7) We now compactify the consumer's p.-decision correspondence. 
o ( •) by substituting the compactified sets Mt' {. xi• and / Z� everywhere 
in the definition of all elements of the model for the original sets M, 
xi, xi, and zj. This process will define the functions or clrrespondences 
i i i  i i i  · · i I i . wt(·), at( •), Ct(·), I\( •), 1\(•), dt( •), �(·), �(·), bt{·), rt(•), . · 
and finally, 6!(·), the compactified p.-decision correspondenbe. Note that 
bi ( ) i ( ) = i ( ) di( )i ( ) m ,s - w s - m ,s where di(.) ( ) 
the tax rules c! ( •) were also compactified in the process. is defined above at 5 
Let i r (m,s) denote i's assessment for bankruptcy (bankruptcy tax) and be 
defined by 
The compactified p.-decision correspondence 
to have the required properties: 
�i(-) t can be shown 
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-i · . .I 0 Lemma l: •\ ( • ) is non-empty, convex valued and u. s. c. on Mt x S 
-·�11-
( 9 )  Define the "fixed point" mapping ptv: Et x � x
• 
S� -+ Et x� xs\I 
where 
0 L+K S = {s = (p,q) EJR+ IElR. + l:kqk : OsU 1, llPD > O} is the price by 
simplex open at llp II = O .  
Proof: Straightforward, but tediously detailed. 
Note that for the definition of ai( •) given in (4.4), if llpO = O, 
ai(s) may not be well-defined. 
(8) Let the space of excess demands for the compactified economy 
be defined by: 
Et : {e E JR
L+Kle (l:i(w
i -wi),y) - l:j z
J, i E �, . y  Eyt' zj E Z�} 
and let Sv denote the closed subset of prices: 
0 
S : {s E S!llPll > v} \} for every 1 > v > d 
Clearly, the sets Et and S \} are non-empty, compact, and convex since . - .I j :\:• Yt =Y(Mt), and zt are. 
Now define the "maximal valuation of excess demand" correspondence 
ntv: Et+ Sv for every t, 
v by: 
nt)e) {s' E S I s' • e > s • e \} for all s E S) 
As in Debreu ( [1959), ( 1 ) of ( 5.6 ) ) ,  ntv(·) is non-empty, convex, and 
u. s.c. at all e E Et for all t > l/Y, 1 > 
v > O. 
Pt)e,m,s) 
..I . I i I j I {(e',m',s') EEt x M.t xs)e' = (l:i(x1 -w ),(') - l:jz 
for y' = y(m'), (x ,m ) E1\(m,s), z Ecpt(s), · 
i I i I -i j I 
I 
j . 
s' E nt)e)} • 
Lemma 2: The correspondence ptv(·) is non-empty, conlex valued 
and u. s. c. at eve_ry point in Et _x � x S" for every t > l/y, l. > v > 0 
�: Straightforward. 
Thus, by Ka�tutani's Fixed Point Theorem, for every (t,�) > (l/y,O) 
(v < 1) , pt ( •) has a fixed point; i.e. there exists \} . 
(i) 
(ii) 
Etv = (<x!v•m!v>' <z�v>' stv) such that 
(x!v,m!v) E �!(mtv'stv) 
zj E cpj (s ) tv t tv 
(iii) stv E nt)et) where etv = (i:;i(x!v - oh ,y(mt)) j- i:jzt. 
(C) Discussion: It is not possible at this point in the proof to 
follow Debreu in one step and convert Etv directly into an erluilibrium 
(or, rather a pseudo-equilibrium for the compactified economy) by showing 
Walras' Law holds, thus tb�t excess demand is non-positive, and hence that 
I . the free disposal assumption permits a modified production plan with no loss 
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in profits but which eliminates all excess supply. The difficulty is 
two-fold. First, in order to show Walras' Law holds even on the truncated . 
price simplex Sv it is necessary to show that the aggregate amount of 
bankruptcy is less than the aggregate solvency . Second to show Walras' 
Law holds on the entire simplex, we must consider the sequence of fixed 
points Et\/ as \) goes to zero. 
( 10 )  Lemma 3 :  For every t > l/y, 1 > v > 0, at the fixed point ·E �v 
i )i ( (a) i::ibt (mtv . ,st) > 0 
(b) y(mt) ::= 0 
(c) stv • etv = o_ and thus, s • etv � o for all s � s" . 
Proof : (a) Suppose to the contrary that i )i( l:ibt(mtv ,stv) < O. 
Then, by definition 
i rt(mtv 'st) 
Thus, for every i, 
{:d as b! l�} 0 
i ( ) i ( ) - i ( ) i ( ) i ( ) {=} i ( ) i ( ) dt mtv ,stv = wt stv - bt mtv ,stv > wt stv -.rt mtv ,stv 
as b! {:} o. 
Now, for each public good k, either (i) yk(mtv) 
(ii) yk(mtv) � 0 . 
- � h - -hll\:tv > 0 or 
(i) If yk(mt) > 0, then {tv = �tv - (a
h(st)I/y(I - l))qktv 
for all h. 
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as 
(This follows since each consumer 
h )h( ) > h h dt(mtv ,stv -
wt(stv) - rt(mtv 'stv) . 
h is minimizing C�(m:"A
l
mi ,stv) 
Also, when yk(mtv) > O ,  none 
of the constraints on the cost minimizations are binding .) 
But then, i::h{tv = ��t� - (I/y(r - l))qktv = i::h{tv - cr;rc r  -· i))qktv 
implying that qktv = 0. Thus, qktv • yk (mt) = 0 if yk (mt) > 0 ) 
(ii) If yk(mtv) � O, then qktVi'k(mtv) � 0 as qktv � 0 .  jll k. 
Thus, in either event, since all consumers are cost minimiz�ng , 
(* )  �v · y(mt) = i::ic!(mtv 'st) < o 
Now by definition of bi( ·) t 
( **) i( )i( ) -l:ibt mtv ,stv -
and w!( -), 
l.:i (pt\/ • (J)
i 
- i::i Min i m EMt 
�n_Ptv •x
i) +  l.:
j
�(st) 
xE� 
i . Ct(mt/m1 ,st) 
y(mt/m
i)_::o 
> -Ei Min 
miEM 
c!(mt/m
i ,st) 
t 
y(mt /m
i) >O \) -
since i E Int �· ptv # 0 ,  and 11�(st) ,:= 0 as 0 E Y� by (d.:li). 
i i i I Now , if y(mt ) > O, ·then \) - Min i m EMt 
i y\.nt /m ) >O \) -
Ct(mtv/m '6tv) = ct(mtv'stv) and 
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( *) and ( **) imply i i Eibt > -EiCt(mtv 'st) > 0 contradicting the assUJII.tltion 
that i Eibt � O. 
But, if bi > 0 t - for any i, then i > -(I - l )l tv - tv implying 
that y(mt ) > O .  v - Thus, b �  ( m�� 
( ,st) < 0 for evecy i, which implies 
that r�(mtv 'stv ) = 0 and also that 
( i i ) E i( )i( i( )) xtv 'mtv st mtv ,stv ;  wt stv for every i 
However, then 
Then 
c!(mtv 'st) 3 w�(st) - 1:fin. ptv • x
i > 0 as above 
xi� 
EiC�(mtv 'stv ) > 0 contradicting f*) .  Hence 
. ) . ( Eib�(mt� ,stv) > 0 as was to be shown. 
(b) Since . . ) . ( Eib� > O, b�(mt� ,stv ) > O for some i which 
implies mt
i > -(I - l)µt
i and thus y(mt ) > 0 as was to be shown. v - v v -
(c) At the fixed point Etv ' for every i, either 
(iii) 
i i 
Ptv • xtv + Ct(mtv 'st) 
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d�(m��( ,st) > w!(st) which implies that 
i i )i( � wt(stv) - bt(mtv ,stv) 
where strict inequality holds only if 
c!Cmtv/fil
i,stv) < Min i 
. i 
c�(mt/m ,st) 
m eit 
y(mt/m
i)�O 
which can occur only if yk(mtv) < 0 for some k, a possibiliiy excluded 
by (.b ). 
Thus, 
Ptv • Eix!v + Eic! = Eiw�(st) - Ei 
bi>o t-
i i rt - Ei bt 
bi<O t 
Or, using the definitions of w;, r;, and the fact that Ei c! t �v • y(mtv), 
( i i ) ..: . j (ptv • Ei xtv - w ) ' �v • y(mt) - stv • Ej ztv 
= stv • etv 
= I Ei b� l ' ­
bi<O t 
0 
i Ei rt 
i bt�o 
(i) (xtv 'mt) E o! which implies by non-satiation (b·. l) 
and convexity (b. 3) that ptv • x!v + . c!(mtv 'st) = w!(st) - r!(mtv 'st), or since 
i Eibt > 0 by (a) .  
Thus, since stv E ntv(etv) ' (ii) i( )i( ) - i( ) i( ) . dt mtv ,stv wt stv - rt mtv 'stv which also 
implies that ptv • x!v + c!(mtv 'st) = w!(st) - r�(mtv 'st) •  or O= s • e > s • e tv tv - tv 
proof of Lemma 3. 
for every s ES , completing C b )  and the v 
- ·)•)-
(11) For fixed t > l/y, consider the sequence of fixed points 
e:tv as \} .... o .  Since e:t\I for every v < 1 is in the compact space 
. j 0 L+K i_ (� x Mt) J Ztx S where S :: closure S = {
s Ell\ \ lls ll = s • 1. = l}, 
the sequence has a limit point 
A - Ai Ai A j A e:t - (<xt,mt> ' <zt> ' st) , It is easy 
to see that at the limit point s • e = 0 and s • e < 0 t t t - for every 
s ES .  Terns ,  by the same argument as in Debreu - [1959), excess demand 
A 
et can be shown to be non-positive, i . e. et .:5 o .  
Thus, by the a�:sumption of free disposal ( d .  4 ) , there exists a 
net aggregate production plan 
<�j> be such that z'l E Zj 
zt E z 
and i:: zj 
j t 
such that zt = zt + et . Let 
-
t t t = zt. 
(12) 
�: 
Lemma 4 : Consider the point 
(a) 
Ai i -et =  (l:i(xt - w ),y(mt)) 
(b) �� E .j>j(�t). 
Ai Ai 
e:t = ( <xt,mt> ' 
i:: �j = 0 
j t 
is immediate from the definition of -j zt . 
-j A <zt> ' st ) . 
(a) 
(b) since ;t • �t = O, by the construction of 
-j zt, 
A Aj A -j st • zt = s • zt. 
By the u. s.c. of 4>;( •), zt E.j>�(st). But since 
zj E Zj and as s • �j = s • zj t t t t t t '  
interior of the cube BL+K(n(t)) 
�t E 4>j ( ;t) , thus proving (b). 
-j j A zt E 4>t(st) . Also, as 
containing Z� and Zj 
-
e:t 
-j zt 
is attainable , 
is in the 
is convex, 
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We note also for future use the following easily verified results: 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
'ITj ( s ) = 'ITj ( s ) t t t 
i A i A w (st) = wt(st) 
A i Min pt • x 
xi� 
Min pt • x
i 
.}exi 
(D) Discussion: Lemma 4 establishes two of the three properties e:t 
must satisfy to be an equilibrium. Thus, to prove the existenc� Jheorem 
we have remaining only to show that ·for some t > l/y, 
Ai Ai i A)i( A i A (a) (xt,mt) Ee; (mi ,si ; w (st)) 
• Ai Ai -i • I  A This we will show in three steps. First, we show (xt,mt) EClt(ni:t •st) 
which requires that pt # O .  Second, we show that for some t
. 
srficiently 
large, the compactification bounds on the message space are not binding 
at the point mt, i . e. -tl_ < m� < Itl_ all i .  This will establlsh that 
Ai Ai -i A A (xt,mt) E Cl (mt,st) . Finally we show for this sufficiently largel t that 
no consumer is · bankrupt or just barely solvent so that 
(Ai Ai) i(A )i( A i(A )) • xt,mt E Cl mt ,st ; w st as required. 
(13) Lemma 2 = .  For every t > l/y, at the point 
Ai Ai -i A A . and thus , (b) (xt,mt) E Clt(mt,st) . 
e:t, (a) pt .; 0 
h'.22.f: (b) follows from (a) by the u . s . c .  of 6! < • ) at �t if 
A I . pt # o .  To prove ( a) ,  suppose pt = · o . By Assumption (d . 5), forl some L _ o . oj z E lR and c > O ,  (z , z t + c 1) = z E z. Let <z > be such rthat x x y -
�j E Zj 
oj o and i::j z = z • .  
•; 
-l1 1 -
By Lemma 4 ,  zi E 4,J( ;t ) which implies • - J • oj st • zt � st • z • 
• -j st •  i::j zt st •  zt 
• Oj • 0 q • z  > s • i:: z = s • z yt - t j t 
• 0 � • zy 
Thus , Claim 2:  
12:22.f: 
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•i mt > -t for every t sufficiently large. 
Suppose not. Then for some public good k and consumer 
I 
there is a sequence t /I' "' n as n /'"' 
•i = -t with mt k n for all n. n 
i ,  
� • < zyt + c ]J = � • zyt + c <it • l > � • zyt , · n ( '  ) > 0 contradictio • 'By Lemma 3 ,  Yk mtv 
. I 
for every t and \I. Thus yk( mt ) .:: 0 for n 
l (14) Lemma 6:  For t sufficiently large, 
12:22.f: 
( a )  
··i -t]:. < mt < It]:. for every i and 
( b) ·i •i -i • • ( xt ,mt) E e ( mt ,st ) 
( b )  follows from ( a )  since ·i L xt E int B ( n ( t ) ) ( as  
•i xt 
attainable ) ,  and �� E ;nt Mt. Thus , the compactification contraints 
i 
is 
are not binding anywhere. Then by convexity of r '  preferences' and the 
budget correspondence Si( . ) ,  the result follows. 
To show (a ) , we first show ·i mt < It 1. . for t sufficiently large 
and then 'i -t1. < mt. 
Claim 1: m� < It].. for every t sufficiently large, for all i. · 
Proof� Suppose not. Then for some public good k and consumer i ;  
there is a sequence t /_r 00 n as n -"' "'  with 
But , for every tn 
Yk<ffit l n 
·h 
�mt k n 
h Itn + i::h#imt k .:: Itn n 
But yk (mt ) is bounded above for every n 
contradiction establishes Claim 1 .  
t n 
·i mt k = Itn n 
( I  - l)tn 
for all n. 
t ,R m  n 
since it is attainable. The 
·i ·i every t n Thus , mt k < µt k and hence i is not in a bankrup or n n 
minimum wealth condition. Th:US' i is maximizing preferences atl each point 
t • Also ,  yk(it ) ,:: 0 n n 
implies ·h i::h#imt k .:: tn n 
all n and thus,, 
. . ·:t [( I - 1)/I](�� k - µt k) < -t . - n n n 
•i • ·i . L+K ' Since (xt ,yt ) : ( xt ,y(mt) )  E int B ( n( t ) )  (by attainability) ,  
by convexity of >f- ,  ( Assumption a )  and non-satiation (Assumptioh b.l) , 
-i E . .i ( -i • ) ·i • ) l there is some xt At such that xt ,yt >:i, ( xt ,yt • Furthermore, by the compactness of the attainable set , .  co vexity of 
xi, continuity and convexity of preferences ( b.2 and b. 3) , there! exists 
a small strictl:y positive number c > 0 ,  such that for every t 
-i - _ -i • + ·i • -i - E i ( xt ,yt ) = ( xt , Y/Ytk c )  >i ( xt ,yt ) and ( xt ,yt ) \ 
Also , since the attainable set is compact ,  there exists a maximU:m distance 
• I _ _i r; such that if "'i ,. ( xt ,y  t ) is attainable , there exists some i� E;: X- within 
� of "i xt ; i.e. nx! - x� n � �. and c x; ,yt ) >i (x� .�'t> · 
Now as in ( Groves and Leeyard [1977], ( 6 )  in Proof of '1$eorem 4.1 ) , 
. ' -i - ·i • for every t , since ( xt ,Jt ) �i ( xt ,yt ) ,  n n n n n 
where 
-4'3-
-i Ai - A Ai Ai A p • x  + C • y > p  • X  + C • y tn tn y tn tn tn y tn 
'i i A A 0 Cy : at (st )qt + y( ( I  - l)/I ) (mi n n n tn 
Ai ) µ • tn 
Thus , for every n, 
0 < P+ • < X! - x� ) + Ta! (st )� k + y(I � 1 Hm! k - µ! k) ] c  "Il . . n n n n n n n 
• ( ) • ( Ai Ai ) i (
A ) A and since ( I - 1 / I )  mt k - µt k .:;: -tn ' and at st � k .::: 1 n n n n n 
A -j Ai -i Ai 0 < pt • ( x-t - xt ) + [l - yt ]c � uxt - xt n + (1 - yt ) c n n n n n n n 
< � + ( 1  - yt ) c  - n 
= (� + c) - (yc)t  for all n n 
But for tn sufficiently large ( �  + c) - (yc)t < O. . n Contradiction, thus . 
establishing Claim 2 and Lemma .6. . Q. E .D 
(E) Discussion: By Lemmas 4 and 6, for some sufficiently la�ge t ,  
there exists - - :i Ai - j A Et - (<xt,mt> ' <zt>' st) 
( Cl 1 ) 
( f3 )  
( y ) 
Let 
'i Ai -t A A (xt ,mt) E a· (mt 'st) 
�j E <j>j(; ) t t 
Ai i A (i;i (xt - w ) ,y(mt) .) 
" * . * j* E* : (<xi ,mi >, <Z >, s*)  
let y* = y(m*) . 
-j i:j
zt 
Et 
such that 
for the sufficiently large t ,  and 
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" * " * i ) ' ( * . To show new that (xi ,mi ) E o (m i ,s* ;  wi(s*) ) ,. we need to show 
that no
. 
oon,umer i• bank�pt cir in bi• min,_ vorth oonditi= tt , • ,  i.e . 
that bi(m*,s* ) > 0 .  for all ·i, which will then mean that no b,ankruptcy taxes 
are assessed, i.e . ri(m*,s*) = 0 all i . Thus, 
(xi*,mi*) E :fcm)i(*,s*; wi(s* ) ) if i C m* ,s*) = 0 
and 
(i*,mi*) E c1 C m) i(* ,s*,wi(s11)) if bi(m*,s*) > 0 
• t 
To show bi(m*,s*) > 0 we will show .that Assumption (e ) wi+,l imply that 
y* = y(m*) E H  and then use this fact to show bi > O . 
(15) Lemma 7: At E*, 
(a ) y* = y(m*) E H  
(b) q* • y* + lq*2 < i; .(wi(s*) -y i 
(c) 
f!:Q2f.: 
bi( ) i(* * )  0 m ,s > all i 
Min i p* . x ) 
iec1 
(a) Suppose y* li!: H. Then by Assumption e, there is some · 
attainable allocation a '  E P,, y' E H  such that, 
for every i. 
. , I i* (xi ,y' )  >-i (x ,y*)  
Then, since at lea,st one consumer is strictly solve:tjt by Lemma. 3, 
by the same argument used in Lemma 6 {Claim 2 ) , 
i '  i* i Y(I - 1) i* i* I . p* · (x - x _ ) + [cx .(s*) • q* +  I ( m  - µ ) l . Cf - �*) > O 
_11s-
every i with strict inequality for at least one i .  Thus , 
. ' . * p* • l: . (x1 - x1 ) + q* • (y ' - y*) > 0 ]. or 
. ' . * . p* • l:ix1 + q* • y' > p* • l: . x1 + q* • y* = l: .w1 ( s*) (by Lennna 3) ]. ]. 
i i;iw ( s * )  
· i  ij  j i j I i; . p* · w  + i:j· i: . e  ;r ( s* )  > i; .p* · w + i:js*z ]. ]. - ]. 
i;ipi• • w
i + s*[i:i ( x
i '  - wi ) .y ' ) 
• I  
i;.p* · xi + q* • Y' ]. 
Contradiction ; thus ( a) is established. 
(b ) y* E H  implies there exists a' E A ,  y '  = y* + ( l/y ) 1. 
and (l: . (x
i ' - wi ) ,y ' ) ]. 
Thus 
'i' j I "j z 
p*· Lxi1+ q*· y ' = p ·• · i: wi + l:  s * • zj '  < p* • l: w1 + i: E e1j irj ( s*) ]. i .j - i i j 
= Eivi ( s * )  
Hence 
q* · ·y • q* • y* + 1.q* • l  < E .v1 ( s*) - p* • E . x1 1 < E . (wi ( s*) - Min p* • x!-� . 
and 
since 
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O = q* • y* + 1. q*2 < i: (,i ( s*) - Min p* • x1 )  i f  q* = 0 , y i . i . x EX1 
i . w E Int i" and p* :f o.  Thus (b ) i s  proved.  
( c ) By definition 
bi ( m) i { *  ,s* )  (w ( s*)  - Min p* • i>  i 
xief 
Min 
miEM 
y(m*/mi )_::o 
Ci ( m*/m1,s 
By (b )  and the definition of ai ( s*) , 
( A) . ci ( m*/mi ,s*) i ) i ( *  i 1 2 b ( m  ,s* )  > a ( s *) [q* • y* + y- q* ] - Min 
mi EM 
y ( m*/mi ) _::O 
. " * " * - ·  Now, since y* = y ( m*)  > 0 an d  ( x1 , m1 ) E o1 ( m* ,s*) , 
i ) " ( *  i ( B )  it" b ( m  1 , s* )  :; O ,  then C ( m* ,s * )  Min 
i m 
y( m*/m1 ) _::o 
. i C1 ( m*/m ,s* which 
y - - ]. ]. - ]. x1ef implies that i* " *  m < µi and i i* i* Cl ( s * ) q* + y(  ( I - 1 ) /I ) (m - µ ) > 0. Thus 
Since q�. < 1 all k ,  
1 2 1 ( i ( ) . i ) q* • y* + -q* < q* • y* + - q* • 1 < E . w s *  - Min p* • x y y - - l. i . x ex1 
i f  q* :f 0 
i *  i*  ai ( s*)I  0 > ( m  - µ ) � - y(I _ l) q* which implies ( m
i * _ µ
i*)
2 < (chs11))2r2 2 
- I 2 q* y (I  - 1.) 
Hence 
i C ( m* , s *) 
( C )  
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ai ( s *)q* . y* + 1.. [-I - ( mi* i* )2 ( i* )
2 ] 
2 I - l  
- µ - er 
. I . 2 2 < a1 ( s* )q* • y* + ( ) ( ct ( s*) ) q* 2y I - 1  
i ) [ i ( s*)I  2 ) < a  (s* ql.+ • y* + ,., __ , :,. :, , q* < ai ( s* )  [ q* • y* + 1.q*2 ] y 
Comb'ining (A) , ( B ) , and ( C ) , if bi ( m) i ( *, s * )  < O ,  then 
0 � bi ( m) i ( * , s *) > �i ( s *)_( q* • y* + �q*2 ) ·ci ( m* , s * )  > O 
Contradiction . Thus , 1ii ( m) i ( * ,s*) > O ,  all i .  Q.E .D .  
y 
s.l 
]/.  
l.±.1 
'2.! 
§_/ 
II 
§I 
2./ 
l�/ 
11/ 
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Footnotes 
See Groves and Leayard [1977 ) ,  Remark 4 . 3 ,  p. Boo . 
Both the mechanisms of Hurwicz [1976 ) and Walker [ 19 77 )  have the 
property that Lindahl allocations are ( Nash ) equilibrium allocations . 
Thus , the conjecture is true for their mechanisms . However J their 
mechanisms have some other , poss ibly less desireable ,  propetties 
not posses sed by our mechanism. 
Lindahl allocations never leave a consumer worse off than at Ibis initial 
endowment .  
The notation <xi> denotes the I-tuple ( x1 , • . •  ,xr} ;  similarly for 
j ij <z >, <G > ,  etc . . I ' As the allocation rule y( . )  for our government depends only on j oint 
messages m ( see ( 2 . 2 ) below ) ,  henceforth y ( m , s )  = y(m) . ! Also , 
throughout we use the notation 
) i (  _ ( 1 i-1 i+l I ) m = m , • • •  ,m ,m , • • •  ,m 
/-i _ 1 i-1 -i i+l I ) m tn = (m ,  • • • ,m ,m , rn  , • • •  ,m 
In our earlier paper we called this government the Optimal government 
referring to the property that competitive equilibria under J this 
government are Pareto-optimal. However,  as other mechanisms ( see 
introduction) also have this property , the label "Optimal" �eems no 
longer appropriate and possibly misleading. I This s ection may be skipped without loss of continuity in the formal 
analysis  of the paper. 
I This requires verifying that � . Ci ( m) = y ( m) for every m E  Mr . 
Michael Rothschild brought this
1
point to our attention in slme clas s . 
notes [1976 ) which also contain an analysis of our mechanis� in the 
simple two good nee-clas sical economy . 
/ The scalar l/Y can be replaced by . the smaller scalar I/2r I - 1 )  • .  
Assumption A. 4 and the restriction of Theorem 3 on the parameters a 1  
impose joint restrictions on the economies and parameters o f  the 
mechanism. This type of joint restriction seems unavoidabl� when 
potential bankruptcy is present. An example of a similar aksumption 
. can be found in Debreu [ 1962 ) for private goods only competitive models 
when initial endowments are · not required to be in consumers )• consump-
tion sets . · 
· 
12/ 
1 3/ 
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Our n tandard arrnumptinnc1 nrc ncn.rly ldcnt i t'a] to Dcbrcu' n  [1CJ5<) ] 
for the pri. vn.tc p:ood!1 only cconoll\Y and nrc qu i te nlmllar to 
Mil.le ron ' s  (1972 ] or Foley ' :; (1970 ] ass umption:> for proving the 
existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. 
Both �li lleron (1972 ] and Foley [1970 ] in proving the existence of 
Lindahl equilibria need assumptions to rule out private goods prices 
being driven to zero . Foley assumes t�e aggregate technology set 
of the economy is a cone and that every public good is producible . 
Milleron assumes .initial endowments ( of private and public goods ) 
are in the interior of ·consumers ' consumption sets and that there is 
an attainable allocation such that each producer is in the int•·:rior 
of his production sets . Thes e assumptions imply our Assumption ( d. 5 ) . 
-50-
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